It’s getting harder to remember that the current American military adventure abroad was launched to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Following an American air attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, the deciding battle was to take place last December in the Battle of Tora Bora. U.S. forces attacked about 1,000 of Osama bin Laden’s forces, killing or capturing some 250. The rest got away, presumably mostly to the Pakistan side of its border with Afghanistan in an area dominated by Pashtun tribal societies, which occupy an area of about 10,000 square miles somewhat beyond the reach of Pakistani civil authority. Other Al Qaeda fighters dispersed to friendly territories in Yemen and Sudan.
Most of those who believe bin Laden alive think he is hiding in this tribal area of Pakistan. This region was independent of government control for over a century, and it was an area where the ISI – the Pakistani intelligence agency – recruited and encouraged Islamic militants who were active in a covert war against India. There are an estimated 50,000 armed members of tribal militias, most of which supported the Taliban and bin Laden. There are said to be at least 10 different armies here. Although this is the area most often mentioned as a possible hiding place for Al Qaeda leaders, earlier this year there were few – less than a dozen – U.S. military operatives in the area looking for them.
The reason has more to do with Pakistani politics than with police work. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf heads a Moslem country that has strong emotional ties to America’s enemies, and the border areas are a very delicate issue for him. In 1998, when the U.S. tried to kill bin Laden with a cruise missile, which struck a training camp inside Afghanistan, the missile killed 21 members of a Pakistani jihadi group. They were attending a meeting at the camp, but their presence removes any doubts about connections between Al Qaeda and the Pashtun tribals.
Al Qaeda operatives move relatively safely in this world, but good police work has taken its toll on the organization. In February 2002, Abu Zubaida, a high-ranking strategist for the group and its chief recruitment officer, was living with a group of Saudis, Sudanese and Yemeni in the city of Faisalabad. His whereabouts was discovered by FBI monitoring of satellite phone conversations. The FBI told Pakistani authorities where to look. Following a gun battle with the people in the house, Zubaida was arrested. Although shot three times, he survived and was turned over to U.S. authorities. He is considered one of the prizes thus far.
In spring 2002 there were more clashes in the tribal areas. When Pakistani soldiers tried to arrest 30 alleged Al Qaeda fighters in Wana in Waziristan, a gun battle broke out and ten Pakistani soldiers were killed. All 30 Al Qaeda escaped. In another incident, eight men chanting “God is great!” awoke a guard and an argument ensued. The police tried to arrest them but an angry crowd of 200 wrested them away, defending them as Islamic scholars. The police claimed there were four Al Qaeda among them. The Pakistani army arrived and a battle ensued. In the end, more than a dozen were arrested, but none of the original eight. The next day, there were street protests, and later religious parties sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda won 52 seats in the Pakistani parliament. They had never won more than four seats in previous elections. This alarmed Pakistani politicians because it is a warning that aggressive pursuit of Al Qaeda could destabilize Pakistan and its pro-American leadership. Elections aside, it’s not difficult to envision an armed rebellion in this heavily armed and politically volatile place.
On Sept. 11, 2002, a three-hour gun battle took place in Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city. The incident produced the arrest of Ramzi bin al Shibh, a suspected member of an Al Qaeda cell in Germany that is thought to have been part of the conspiracy of 9-11. Eight Yemenis, two Egyptians and a Saudi were also arrested, but there is evidence the biggest prize got away. The FBI alleges that Halid Sheik Mohammed was a chief mastermind of 9-11. Authorities say he probably fled to Yemen, or some such place outside Pakistan. It’s possible. There are armed tribal militias in Yemen and much support for the ideas of bin Laden. In this, one of the poorest countries in the Middle East, there have been bombings in protest of arrests of Al Qaeda suspects. Yemen is the site of the attack on the U.S. warship Cole in which 17 Americans were killed.
Last year, President Bush demanded that Yemen apprehend two Al Qaeda operatives, Ali Qaed Sinan al Harethi and Mohhamed al Ahdal. Al Harethi was accused of being the mastermind behind the Cole bombing. On Dec. 18, Yemeni armed forces located and tried to arrest them. A gun battle ensued between Yemeni military and local militia, and 22 Yemeni soldiers were killed. The suspects escaped arrest. Six villagers died. Shortly thereafter, Al Qaeda attacked a French oil tanker. The U.S. then struck a deal with the Yemeni government, which resulted in an American Hellfire missile from an unmanned drone blowing up a car carrying al Harethi and five others, including an American citizen from Lackawanna, N.Y. This happened on Nov. 4. Some observers expressed discomfort at this event because it was an example of the United States undertaking an extra-judicial execution on foreign soil.
On Nov. 18, USA Today reported that an audiotape, supposedly made by Osama bin Laden, was determined by U.S. government technicians to be genuine. In the tape, bin Laden refers to recent events. It was the first tape of bin Laden since December 2001, and commentators stated it is proof he has survived and is still inspiring Al Qaeda. About two weeks later, Swiss technicians who examined the tape said there’s a 60 percent chance it’s a fake. Whether bin Laden is alive is still open to debate, but there is little question Al Qaeda is alive and is aggressively seeking softer targets. The struggle with Al Qaeda is looking less like a war and more like a blood feud. Blood feuds are usually fought with no end-game on either side. They go on until one side or both are exhausted. It often takes a long time.
John C. Mohawk, Ph.D., columnist for Indian Country Today, is an author and professor in the Center for the Americas at the State University of New York at Buffalo.